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BOOK REVIEWS
SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW, edited by Edmund Cahn, Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, 1954. Pp. 259, $4.00.
This collection of essays purports to take stock of the American Institution of
Judicial Review after approximately 150 years. Certainly no excuse is necessary for
such an undertaking, but it would be interesting to know more than the foreword
divulges about the occasion for this particular collaboration. Professor Cahn is pre-
sumably responsible for bringing the authors together in the book, but at least part of
their performance appears to have been put on before an audience with the editor as
an informal master of ceremonies. Thus, each of them first delivers himself of a rela-
tively short paper on which the others comment extemporaneously. Following this,
however, come longer papers on which no comment is reported-leaving the reader
to guess that the latter were separately prepared, perhaps after it had been decided to
commit the joint enterprise to print.
At all events there is much more substance in the final chapters (IV through VII)
than in the earlier ones--excepting only chapter one which evidences both careful
preparation and seasoned analysis. Professor Cahn calls this chapter "An American
Contribution," by which he means the flexibility imparted to the theory of the written
constitution by both judicial review and provision for formal amendment. The point
is well-taken: We are too often led to believe that our adaptation of the written con-
situation itself established the "type" by completing a scheme already implicit in
earlier models. Bryce, no doubt, contributed to this over-simplification by emphasizing
the relative rigidity of the American Constitution as contrasted with the British.
Cahn's observations are more sagacious.
Chapter II on "Conditions and Scope of Constitutional Review" includes essays by
Ralph Bischoff, John P. Frank, and Paul Freund. Freund is a little too brief and
tentative in his comments to afford basis for review. Bischoff and Frank do a com-
petent job of marshalling limited case materials but their conclusions are more
respectable than profound.
Chapter III is devoted to "The Process of Constitutional Construction" and includes
another essay by Bischoff plus two by Willard Hurst and Charles Curtis respectively.
Hurst's observations of the "Role of History" stem from a consideration of three
cases, in two of which the historical meaning of terms at the time the document was
framed dictated their judicial interpretation; in the other interpretation was dictated
by developments post-dating the drafting of the language. This provides a usefully
concrete setting for a theoretical controversy familiar to all students of constitutional
law, and Hurst treads these hot sands with unblistered feet. In short, he concludes
that "The underlying, inarticulate policy seems sound. If the idea of a document of
superior legal authority is to have meaning, terms which have a precise history-filled
content to those who draft and adopt the document must be held to that precise mean-
ing. On the other hand, when the document speaks in generic terms to outline sub-
stantive power and to announce standards for the use of power, 'we must never forget
it is a constitution we are expounding'."
Charles Curtis follows this eminently judicious performance with an essay on "The
Role of the Constitutional Text" which is thoroughly provocative and not a little
ambiguous. "Men intend," says Curtis, "words mean." And this observation useful
as it undoubtedly is for some purposes, leads him to what seems to be a sweeping
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denial that the meaning of the constitutional text should ever be fixed by reference to
historical considerations.
In other words he starts by condemning intent because of the subjectivism thereby
imported into the process of judicial construction; he winds up condemning it because
of its nominalism (ie., its tendency to fix meaning by reference to the denotation rather
than the connotation of words). And in so shifting the ground of his condemnation he
necessarily incurs the deep suspicion of common law lawyers in particular, where he
might have had their hearty approval.
Mr. Bischoff's second and last appearance in the volume is on "The Role of Judicial
Precedents." It is well done. In fact, one gets the impression here that he is in full
command of all the factors entering into his problem-a high compliment considering
that stare decisis has the widest conceptual range of all the institutional doctrines of
our law.
All of the longer articles are good. To be sure, one suspects Mr. Frank has more
enthusiasm for civil liberties than he has understanding of, or sympathy for, the
limitations of law as a distinctive method of social control. Hence his reaction to the
fact that the Court has not championed personal liberty in times of stress has the
familiar.flavor of liberal disillusionment. But Frank does indulge some useful specula-
tion on possible indirect effects of judicial review. Thus, it is likely, he thinks, that
the power to declare acts of congress unconstitutional may have contributed to the
relative boldness of the Court in dealing with state legislation.
Professor Freund's "Review and Federalism" steers a more sober course: Despite
his recognition that "Today national power over the economy is scarcely challenged,"
he is not at all sure that federalism is, so to speak, "through." At least there is some
restraint in the necessity of securing'authentication of the congressional power claimed
from the judicial branch. Beyond this, the contribution of the Court has been to safe-
guard a national commercial interest against local barriers, and Freund shows little
patience with Mr. Justice Black's preference for Congress rather than the Court as
the guardian of the Commerce clause.
In discussing "Review and the Distribution of National Powers" Professor Hurst
is again a judicious critic. On the whole, he discounts any notion of judicial responsi-
bility for the shaping of basic institutional relationships within the government: "The
Court decisions which so radically reduced the effective scope of the 14th amendment
form a unique chapter in the story of judicial influence on the separation of powers
within the national government" (page 158), and (page 166) "the future of judicial
review as a creative force in our public policy lies more in a jealous safeguarding of
the position of the individual in the application of law than in surveillance of general
policy making."
Finally, there is Mr. Curtis again; this time to intrigue us on the subject, "Review
and Majority Rule." His theme here is that judges watch the election returns. But,
instead of resting on this somewhat hackneyed conclusion he gives us a mild touch of
Rousseau in his analysis of the significance of this innocent habit. Thus, Mr. Dooley's
prosaic observation of what judges do in fact is turned into something the judges ought
to do in fulfillment of a democratic faith. The Constitution speaks an immanent law
of "we the people" even as the judges elaborate the meaning of the ostensibly technical
language of the document. Take due process of law for example: "When they put it
into the fifth amendment its meaning was as fixed and definite as the common law
could make a phrase .... It meant a procedural process which could be easily ascer-
tained from almost any law book. We turned the legal phrase into common speech
and raised its meaning into the similitude of justice itself." Well, at least let us hope
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not. Volkreck is a mirage which we (being blessed by a fair correspondence between
our authoritative institutions and our "national consciousness") certainly do not have
to conjure up. And this means that there is no reason why we should not recognize
juristenrecht as the reality behind our constitutional law.
KENNETH C. COLE*
FREEDOM, JUSTICE, EQUALITY: Report on Civil Liberties, January, 1951-June, 1953;
American Civil Liberties Union, New York. Pp. 158, $.50.
Published by ". . . the only permanent nation-wide non-partisan body devoted solely
and comprehensively to .. .help [ing] create ... universal and eternal vigilance ..."
in the assertion and defense of civil liberties, the contents of this Report are worthy of
note, whether or not one agrees with A.C.L.U.'s self-characterization.
Following the sequence of its title, the first section of the Report is denominated
"Freedom of Expression," and examines many instances of censorship and boycott, by
lay and religious groups, in all major communications media-newspapers, books,
magazines, radio, motion pictures and television. The incidents include the picketing
of the movie "Limelight," radio and television "blacklisting" practices, and municipal
and church attempts to prevent the performance of various plays and the screening of
several motion pictures. The section also reports on security and loyalty measures
throughout the United States, including accounts of the several United States Supreme
Court cases concerning loyalty oaths. It examines academic freedom in public schools
as well as universities. The report on religion and conscience which concludes the
section deals with problems of conscientious objectors under the Selective Service
System, and the various programs for religious instruction in public schools.
The second major division of the Report is entitled "Justice and Due Process." It
provides a picture of the problems arising, especially in criminal cases, from the
inadequacy of certain judicial processes, improper police practices, and wiretapping.
With regard primarily to the national government, this section describes at length the
issues generated by legislative committee and executive department procedures, par-
ticularly in loyalty and security investigations.
"Equality Before the Law" is the final substantive grouping made by the Report,
and includes cases which have involved discrimination based on race, creed and national
origin. Also discussed within this section are problems which have grown from what
the Union terms the struggle for internal democracy in labor organizations.
The three major divisions of the Report contain accounts of several local matters,
including an indictment against a Seattle writer whose pamphlet on marriage instruc-
tion had been deemed obscene by the grand jury, and the controversy which arose in
Seattle concerning Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act, when KING-TV
cancelled a speech by U. S. Senator Joseph McCarthy, in support of former U. S.
Senator Harry Cain, on grounds of possible libel.
Detailed information on A.C.L.U. structure, personnel, membership, and finances
appear in the last seventeen pages of the booklet. Explaining the period covered by
the Report, the Foreword states that the executive staff of the Union has been so busy
with cases during the past three years that it has been unable to issue what would
have been the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd Annual Reports: since, as the Foreword further
states, "Litigation continues to be the Union's chief field of activity . . .," the phe-
nomenon of growth in membership and activity of A.C.L.U. in the past three years
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